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“Soft Balancing” avant la Lettre: Latin America and the United States 
Max Paul Friedman 
Tom Long 
 
Faced with unilateral U.S. military intervention, a coalition of secondary powers—including 
both traditional rivals and allies—publicly questions the United States’ use of its unchallenged 
might. Turning to international organizations and law, bilateral diplomacy, coalition building, 
and public rhetoric, though never to overt military alliances, these countries seek to constrain the 
ability of the United States to deploy military force, following a pattern that has been referred to 
as “soft balancing.” Variations of this story are present in the literature; most describe global 
responses to the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the debate on soft balancing largely 
has been confined to the post-Cold War world. A similar description is apt, however, for a 
previous era, too. Starting with the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States launched 
frequent interventions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.1 This earlier era of 
unbridled, unilateral U.S. interventionism also drew important responses that represent a 
valuable case offering new insights into the nature and effects of soft balancing.  
Robert Pape’s influential argument on “soft balancing” holds that weaker states confronting a 
unipolar power may leverage “nonmilitary tools, such as international institutions, economic 
statecraft, and strict interpretations of neutrality” to constrain the superpower.2 In an age of U.S. 
unipolarity, Pape’s concept gave a name to the strategies of states seeking to curtail U.S. power. 
It made an immediate splash in international relations scholarship and policy debates by updating 
balance of power theory. Growing out of the international responses to the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, the debate around soft balancing has focused almost exclusively on very recent history, 
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particularly responses to the perceived unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration. The 
concept has been applied to other situations, too, including the foreign policies of Brazil, India, 
and South Africa;3 Southeast Asian institutionalism,4 and U.S.-European relations.5 With few 
exceptions, these cases are set in the last two decades. The temporally narrow scope of the 
evidence employed in the debate on soft balancing has limited efforts to refine the concept, to 
understand the mechanisms through which soft balancing may occur, and especially to judge its 
possible consequences.  
The importance of expanding scholars’ and policymakers’ understanding of soft balancing is 
theoretical, empirical, and practical. Theoretically, this article demonstrates that soft balancing 
has applications beyond the events for which it was coined. Although the term has been limited 
to situations of global unipolarity, we demonstrate that it can be applied to at least some 
instances of regional unipolarity. The article expands the empirical base for soft balancing into a 
period in which both private diplomatic and public statements are available as evidence; in doing 
so, it also advances the understanding of Latin American agency in U.S.-Latin American 
relations. This evidence demonstrates that soft balancing is statecraft, not just rhetoric for public 
consumption. Finally, soft balancing has largely been seen as a threat to the United States. This 
article shows this need not be the case. In fact, the soft balancing examined here led the United 
States to adjust its policies in the Western Hemisphere toward an approach with less overt 
intervention, which produced great benefits at considerably lower costs. Soft balancing need not 
be feared. 
This article argues that more than a century before the French, Germans, and Russians 
combined at the United Nations to oppose the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Latin Americans sought to 
develop new international norms against military intervention in a strategy that closely resembles 
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descriptions of more recent soft balancing. In response to heightened U.S. interventionism, 
which was demonstrated in practice and declared in doctrine, Argentina and Mexico led an effort 
that contributed to a tidal shift in U.S. policy on military intervention lasting from the 1930s into 
the 1950s and arguably thereafter. These Latin American responses would seem to present an 
ideal case for examining a precedent for soft balancing long before the term was coined. The 
period offers a strong comparative case that is independent from those studied in the more recent 
debate about soft balancing. Scholarly discussion of soft balancing has implicitly assumed that 
because the post-Cold War era is the only modern unipolar system, there are no other relevant 
cases to examine. We see such an example, however, in U.S. relations with Latin America in the 
early twentieth century. The degree of power asymmetry between the United States and its 
southern neighbors at this time was so great that the Western Hemisphere was effectively a 
unipolar system. This provides an invaluable case to add historical depth to examining the 
concept of soft balancing, which otherwise must remain confined to the very recent period in 
which unipolarity characterized the entire globe. (Treating a portion of the world as a system in 
its own right is not unusual, for example, in studies of the European balance of power.) 
Although U.S. actions during this period have received extensive study, Latin American 
reactions have received much less attention. To the degree Latin American actions have been 
considered, they have most often been assumed to fall under U.S. hegemony or to constitute 
bandwagoning. During the pre- World War II period, Latin American states displayed a variety 
of responses to the growth in U.S. power and unilateralism, including trying to constrain its 
exercise. This finding can contribute to the body of work on Latin American agency that disputes 
scholarship wedded to a version of dependency theory in which U.S. hegemony is absolute,6 and 
updates accounts that argue that balancing behavior has not been relevant to intra-American 
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relations.7 It also questions international relations approaches that conform to what David Mares 
has characterized as an oversimplified view of Latin American foreign policy autonomy, in 
which “the constraints posed by the United States are perceived to be so overwhelming that Latin 
American countries are assumed incapable of formulating their own security definitions.”8  
This article contributes to the debate on soft balancing in three main ways. The soft balancing 
debate, like that of balance of power generally, has been dominated by realism. The strategies of 
soft balancing, however, draw heavily on institutions, international law, and the promotion of 
norms that constrain the unipole’s exercise of power. It is also invokes questions of “threat,” not 
just material power, and the perception both of a unipole’s role and intentions. The article seeks 
to refine the concept of soft balancing, both through additional empirical application and through 
more explicit dialogue with institutionalist and constructivist theories, and to more clearly 
delineate the interactive processes of soft balancing. From a methodological perspective, the 
concept of soft balancing has been applied almost exclusively to the circumstances that gave 
birth to it. To demonstrate that a concept is worth its salt, it is important to show that it 
illuminates events and processes separate from the ones it was coined to describe. In a final, 
related point, the article makes important empirical contributions to the soft-balancing literature. 
As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth noted, the presentism of the soft-balancing debate 
has meant that it draws on a limited range of sources—largely public pronouncements—which 
might be less reliable than private information.9 It also means that the process of soft balancing 
was still ongoing and its outcomes were unclear. Examining a historical example, using 
multinational archival sources, can help scholars and policymakers understand where soft 
balancing may lead. In contrast to much of the debate, we conclude that soft balancing need not 
be feared. It will not always lead to hard balancing and greater conflict; in fact, an evolution of 
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great power policies to account for soft balancers’ interests could induce more cooperation and 
mutual benefit. 
The article summarizes the debate over soft balancing, before suggesting further 
developments to this concept that more explicitly connect the concept to liberal and 
constructivist international relations theory. While it makes sense to limit the concept to unipolar 
systems, the article argues that it may also be applied to regional unipolar systems, and that these 
are useful for examining the conditions under which soft balancing occurs. This argument is 
illustrated through the soft balancing behaviors displayed by Argentina, Mexico, and other Latin 
American states in response to U.S. interventions from the 1890s to 1930s. In conclusion, the 
article suggests further directions for the study of soft balancing, while noting that its 
consequences for U.S. policymakers might not be as dire as many scholars have feared. 
The Debate over Soft Balancing 
The debate over soft balancing, chiefly in the pages of this journal, has been characterized by a 
focus on unilateral U.S. actions and the international responses to those actions. The key cases 
reflected responses from secondary powers—primarily China, France, Germany, and Russia—to 
the United States during the administration of George W. Bush. Although there have been some 
empirical disagreements over the facts of these cases, the primary disagreement has been over 
whether these states’ actions represent a response to a perceived increase in the threat posed by 
the world’s lone superpower. This article takes no position on which recent events might qualify 
as soft balancing versus policy bargaining; instead it seeks to clarify the concept and ask whether 
that concept can help illuminate historical situations in which there were multilateral attempts to 
constrain the unilateral use of U.S. power by means other than military confrontation. 
6 
 
The argument for soft balancing, advanced by international relations luminaries Robert 
Pape, Stephen Walt, T.V. Paul, Robert Art, and Charles Kupchan, has received well-reasoned 
criticism from Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth.10 Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander 
have questioned evidence of any balancing behavior today, dismissively saying “that discussion 
of soft balancing is much ado about nothing.”11 The crux of Brooks and Wohlforth’s critique is 
that the original soft-balancing argument fails to consider alternative explanations for these 
states’ behaviors. Many of the actions taken have been overblown and are not systematic 
attempts to constrain and balance the United States. Instead, they are better understood as 
“diplomatic friction,” in Lieber and Alexander’s words, that frequently accompanies policy 
bargaining. Moreover, some of the behaviors originate as responses to domestic politics.12 This 
article takes care to consider the critiques and alternative explanations offered by Brooks and 
Wohlforth. To begin, it reviews the literature on soft balancing with an eye to spelling out the 
crucial elements of a distinct concept of soft balancing that avoids risks of “conceptual 
stretching.”13 This is an important exercise if scholars are to apply the term beyond the 
circumstances for which it was developed.  
Realist scholars traditionally saw balancing as the natural, almost automatic response of 
states in an anarchical system to the rise of a new power.14 This theory led to numerous 
predictions that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with it the bipolar world order, would spur 
the rise of a new balancing coalition.15 Although there have been important critiques of the 
ubiquity of balancing, from hegemonic-stability theory realists,16 historically oriented scholars,17 
and from many outside realism,18 the theory’s parsimony retains considerable appeal. As Brooks 
and Wohlforth note, soft balancing derives part of its conceptual purchase from its implied 
relation to the balance of power. At the same time, the seeming longevity of U.S. unipolarity, a 
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quarter century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has led international relations scholars to 
dedicate greater study to the dynamics of the unipolar world.19  
In the early 2000s, these two developments in international relations theory intersected. 
Spurred largely by concern about the long-term consequences of the United States’ seemingly 
unprecedented embrace of preventive war, Pape and others termed the strong international 
opposition to the U.S. doctrine as “soft balancing.” What are the key components of soft 
balancing? First, it seemingly pertains only to situations of unipolarity. This excludes 
international systems that vary in either direction. In bipolar or multipolar systems, states could 
adopt traditional balancing coalitions to contain the dominant power. In the other direction, if a 
system were hegemonic, balancing would not be feasible given the power and control exercised 
by the hegemon.20 In a recent article, Ilai Saltzman divorces soft balancing from questions of 
polarity (and balance of power theory generally), looking at U.S. policy toward interwar Japan as 
soft balancing.21 Saltzman argues that soft balancing is a foreign policy strategy; in this he is 
correct. Hard balancing is also a foreign policy strategy. Separating balancing behavior from 
questions of coalitions and polarity is a mistake, as it risks collapsing almost any nonmilitary 
response—even by the dominant power—to a change in the distribution of capabilities into soft 
balancing.  
Second, soft balancing is not a direct response to a preponderance of power, but to 
perceptions of power and fear of its unilateral use. It responds to what Walt called the “balance 
of threat.”22 This change helps explain why no immediate rebalancing occurred when it became 
clear in 1990 that the United States had emerged as the unquestioned sole superpower. The post-
Cold War United States did not appear to threaten the sovereignty of the vast majority of states 
in the international system; its military interventions often had at least a veneer of institutional 
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legitimacy that promised a restoration of sovereign rights. Nor is the United States’ tremendous 
wealth predicated on territorial expansion. In short, the United States was a “constrained 
hegemon,” as Paul argued.23 The question of threat instead of power alone places a great degree 
of importance on the intentions of the unipole, or rather on how those intentions are perceived by 
other states. If the unipole is perceived as possessing self-restraint, and particularly if it provides 
benefits in the form of private or public goods, the costs of checking the unipole will outweigh 
the benefits. This difference represents a significant departure from realists’ traditional emphasis 
on the inherent uncertainty of intentions, emphasized especially by John Mearsheimer.24 If the 
unipole is perceived as increasingly imperialistic, soft or even hard balancing is likely to be 
employed. Soft balancing behaviors are not limited to responses to direct threats from the 
unipole. Pape argues that secondary powers can be driven by indirect threats, as in European 
concerns over the planned 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Bush Doctrine’s claim of a right to 
unilateral preventive war, because they fear blowback, the spillover of regional insecurity, or a 
destabilizing precedent. They might also fear that the unipole is seeking hegemony, which would 
materially lessen secondary states’ autonomy and well-being.25 The implications are enormous: 
If power alone were the issue, the only way the unipolar state could prevent balancing would be 
to become less powerful—an unlikely proposition—or become a hegemon, a tall order bringing 
its own risks. In a balance of threat world, changes to the unipole’s behaviors can obviate the 
need for balancing. 
Third, soft balancing is primarily a nonmilitary strategy.26 States deploy a host of other 
instruments instead. Pape notes, “Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, 
entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a 
balancing coalition.”27 Providing aid to rivals, including nonstate actors, and excluding the 
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unipole from multilateral political and economic organizations have also been discussed as 
strategies.28 Along these lines, states engaged in soft balancing seek to limit the ability of the 
unipole to “impose its preferences on others” through coordinated action, attempts to augment 
power, and countervailing coalitions.29 Walt emphasizes cooperation as an important aspect of 
soft balancing: “In the current era of U.S. dominance, therefore, soft balancing is the conscious 
coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, 
outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual 
support.”30 
 More controversially, soft balancing is often seen as a possible precursor to hard 
balancing. Soft balancing is a lower-cost, lower-risk strategy for secondary states to pursue their 
priorities without provoking the overwhelming power of the unipole. Forming a balancing 
coalition is always a risky endeavor, in which individual states have incentives to pass the buck, 
free ride, or shirk. Building cooperation is particularly difficult in a unipolar system; more states 
must coordinate their actions, and the unipole can inflict high costs on states that oppose it.  
One of the main criticisms of soft balancing is that it is indistinguishable from the normal 
course of diplomacy and international bargaining that result from disagreements over policy. 
Brooks and Wohlforth call soft balancing “a portentous-sounding term to describe conventional 
policy disputes and diplomatic bargaining” with U.S. interlocutors after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. They argue that these disputes seem important only because unipolarity does not provide 
a frame of reference for real balancing behaviors, as a bipolar or multipolar world did.31 
Advancing a similar critique, Lieber and Alexander argue, “The events used to detect the 
presence of soft balancing are so typical in history that they are not, and perhaps cannot be, 
distinguished from routine diplomatic friction between countries, even between allies.”32 
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Although shades of gray will continue to exist, useful distinctions can be drawn between the two. 
Robert J. Art argues that both routine policy bargaining and soft balancing are inherently focused 
on outcomes vis-à-vis the unipole. Soft balancing, however, is a future-oriented strategy: 
“[P]olicy bargaining is the attempt to produce favorable outcomes with current assets, whereas 
balancing behavior is the attempt to augment assets so as to produce better outcomes the next 
time.”33 Both the temporal and coalition aspects of soft balancing can be used to help distinguish 
it from “routine diplomatic friction.” Kupchan argues that even if many of the behaviors 
associated with soft balancing are “mundane,” they may still be consequential in geopolitical 
terms. What matters are the intentions to constrain the unipole and the consequences of the 
actions taken by soft-balancing states.34  
In addition, Brooks and Wohlforth point to the importance of considering alternative 
explanations: states could be pursuing economic interests, posturing for domestic political aims, 
or worrying about regional security. Although these possibilities must be considered, it is 
important to recognize that the explanations are not mutually exclusive. Brooks and Wohlforth 
argue that any balancing behavior, soft or hard, must be a response to a concentration of power. 
A concentration of power could threaten states’ economic interests (and thus their ability to 
maintain or develop their own power), drawing policy responses that seek to both constrain the 
unipole and advance economic interests. Domestic politics and regional security could 
complement rather than contradict balancing motives.  
Concepts and Cases 
Soft balancing requires further development, both empirical and conceptual. This section 
strengthens the concept by highlighting the implicit use of concepts identified with 
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institutionalism and constructivism in a debate about balancing behavior. It justifies the 
extension of the soft-balancing debate to a period and region that scholars have previously 
overlooked for theoretical and empirical reasons. Finally, it will argues that the case of Latin 
American responses to U.S. interventionism is particularly useful for examining arguments about 
why soft balancing occurs—as opposed to either hard or no balancing. 
Enriching soft balancing 
Soft balancing is, foremost, a foreign policy strategy that aims to constrain through nonmilitary 
means how, where, and why a unipole deploys its unrivaled military power. It does not refer to 
the balance of power as existing equilibrium in the international system.35 Soft balancing does 
not need to be successful to exist, just as hard balancing has existed as a strategy despite failure. 
It could be, but is not necessarily, a precursor to hard balancing. Soft balancing emphasizes 
secondary states’ perceptions of the threat posed by the unipole, meaning changes in perceptions 
will lead to changes in balancing behavior. Soft balancing is not an inevitable reaction to the 
growth of another state’s power. Soft balancing is distinct from policy bargaining, which is 
narrowly focused on a given issue because it has a longer time horizon, and seeks not just to 
limit one particular use of power but the unipole’s ability to deploy that power in the future by 
augmenting the resources available to secondary states. Soft balancing is likely when secondary 
states begin to see the unipole as a direct or indirect threat to their national interests.36 
 Soft balancing, like balance of power theory more generally, has largely been the domain 
of realists. An examination of soft balancing, however, shows the possibilities for more explicit 
dialogue between institutionalist and constructivist approaches and debates about balancing. 
These are worth exploring in two areas: the question of changing perceptions of unipolar 
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intentions and the institutional and normative strategies employed by soft balancers. The 
question of changing perceptions of unipolar intentions goes beyond Walt’s criteria for “threat.” 
He lists these as power resources (or strength), geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and offensive intentions.37 Because resources, geography, and offensive capabilities are too fixed 
to spark soft balancing against a unipole, the explanatory onus falls entirely on intentions—and 
more to the point, other states’ perceptions of those intentions, a matter on which Wohlforth 
made signal contributions a decade before the soft-balancing debate.38 Constructivists have long 
emphasized the interplay between a state’s actions and how its role in international relations is 
defined.39 The United States alone cannot define itself as a “benign hegemon,” a role that 
depends not just on U.S. words and actions but on how those are intersubjectively perceived by 
other actors in the international system. The United States almost certainly did not intend to 
weaken that perception in 2003, but others’ understandings of U.S. doctrines and actions did just 
that. An analysis of soft balancing must be attentive to how perceptions of intentions affect the 
roles states play in international politics. 
 Soft balancing employs tactics that have often received short shrift from realists, which 
has likely contributed to the dismissal of the concept by some critics. If international institutions 
are epiphenomenal to the distribution of power, as many realists have argued,40 then they cannot 
create serious challenges to that distribution. Soft balancing is also discussed as a method of 
overcoming coordination problems under anarchy, drawing on institutionalist theorizing 
advanced by Robert Keohane, David Axelrod, and others.41 Secondary states can use institutions 
to address various needs: At times they may facilitate coordination with or in opposition to a 
unipolar power; they may also be forums to publicize and delegitimize unipolar unilateralism. 
These scholars offer additional insights into how institutional soft-balancing tactics might 
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constrain the unipole. Institutionalism has emphasized the information-sharing role of 
international institutions, which may allow potential soft balancers opportunities to demand 
disclosure, reporting, and monitoring from the unipole. Secondary states may use international 
institutions to press the unipole to make public commitments; while the unipole’s power may let 
it break commitments, international institutions increase the publicity of a commitment and 
therefore enhance domestic and international audience costs.42 Publicly reneging on 
commitments could further erode perceptions of benign intent. The question of perceived U.S. 
intentions has been central to the soft-balancing debate, though “intentions” in these discussions 
have not been limited to narrower understandings of what the United States will do in a 
particular situation. Beneath the surface, the question of “benign hegemony” is actually about 
what role the United States will play in the international system—what will the United States’ 
identity be? The constructivist literature offers insights into the intersubjective construction of 
state identity and its consequences.43 Constructivism also has much to offer for scholars’ 
understanding of normative soft-balancing tactics, including how states may use “rhetorical 
entrapment” to constrain U.S. actions or to increase the costs of those actions.44 A constructivist 
reading of soft balancing might focus on how the unipole seeks to build legitimacy for its 
actions, while opposing coalitions seek to deny it, thus imposing costs and affecting 
decisionmaking. 
Polarity and Soft Balancing 
A key reason for the presentist nature of the debate is that soft balancing has been understood as 
pertaining to global unipolar systems. The power advantage of the unipole encourages states to 
soft balance instead of resorting to military balancing. In bipolar or multipolar systems, shifting 
alliances allow states to compensate for the growing power of a single actor. The implicit 
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assumption has been that because the post-Cold War era is the only modern unipolar system, 
other relevant cases of soft balancing do not exist. 
The Western Hemisphere at the turn of the twentieth century, however, provides such an 
example, nested within a multipolar world. During the period, the degree of power asymmetry 
between the United States and its neighbors became apparent. In 1900 U.S. national income per 
capita was $1495, more than 600 percent greater than the average $220 in Latin America.45 The 
United States had a blue-water navy that had just defeated the Spanish Empire on both sides of 
the globe, while most Latin American countries were limited to a “brown-water” navy of riverine 
boats and a few ships for coastal patrols.46  Although this advantage allowed the United States to 
establish its authority over some of the small states in the Caribbean and Central America, it 
never established hegemony over the entire hemisphere. With regard to the South American 
subsystem, the relationship with the United States cannot be understood either as multipolar—
the U.S. advantage was too great—or hegemonic—U.S. control was inadequate.  
Even if the United States had established a unipolar position within the hemisphere, did 
global multipolarity offer the secondary powers of Latin America other options for traditional 
balancing? Although in theory, and to some extent in commerce, these options did exist, options 
for hard balancing through military alliances with extrahemispheric powers were not an option. 
Despite sporadic U.S. fears about an intrusion by Wilhelmine Germany, only two 
extrahemispheric powers had noteworthy presences. The first was Spain. Most of Latin America 
had fought—or in the case of Cuba, continued to fight—for liberation from Spain and the 
possibility for an alliance against the United States was slight. More important, the Iberian power 
was in advanced decline by the turn of the century, and the war of 1898 definitively established 
its military impotence. Great Britain, the second extrahemispheric power, was more noteworthy, 
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especially as a commercial partner. The United States, however, had steadily pushed the British 
out of the Caribbean and Central America, a shift highlighted by the repudiation of the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, which had granted equal U.S. and British rights to railways and a future canal 
across the Central American isthmus. The possibility of military alliance with Great Britain 
throughout the hemisphere declined steadily throughout the period. Although South American 
independence hero Simón Bolívar and some of his contemporaries advocated alliance with Great 
Britain early in the nineteenth century, and France and French culture certainly had advocates, 
the feasibility of these arrangements declined dramatically by the last quarter of the century. The 
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine that the hemisphere was closed to European powers, which 
was presumptuous in 1823, had become effective by the eve of the World War I, at least in terms 
of military alliances. If Latin American states were going to constrain the growing power of the 
United States, they would have to do so largely on their own. It is worth noting that there are 
numerous precedents for treating a portion of the world as a system in its own right. This has 
often been done, without explicit recognition, in discussions of the European balance of power.47 
Considering the Western Hemisphere as a unipolar system in its own right during this period is 
thus historically accurate and theoretically useful.  
Conditions for soft balancing: Geography, restraint, and asymmetry 
“Discovering” another example of a unipolar system offers strong grounds to examine possible 
soft-balancing behaviors, given the dearth of possible comparative cases. It also provides 
evidence to examine the conditions, such as geography, perceptions of unipolar restraint (or its 
opposite), and power differentials, that Pape and others have argued either provoke or dissuade 
secondary powers from engaging in soft balancing. In doing so, it seeks to better specify the 
concept of soft balancing. 
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The case of Latin American responses to the United States in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries is analogous to the current debate on soft balancing in ways beyond the 
existence of effective unipolarity. The period was marked by an explicit change in stated U.S. 
doctrine, from an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that focused on excluding European 
powers to the Roosevelt Corollary, in which the United States declared its own right and duty to 
intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors. This change of policy was accompanied by 
major changes in practice. “Gunboat diplomacy” by the United States and European powers had 
been common—and frequently denounced by Latin Americans—in the late 1890s; now the 
United States began a period of larger military interventions. Importantly, these led to a number 
of occupations of much longer duration than previous military episodes. Although it might be an 
exaggeration to say U.S. intentions were considered benign before 1898, given the Mexican 
experience and widespread suspicion of filibustering expeditions, the combination of growing 
U.S. economic and military clout and the alacrity with which it was employed spurred a new 
level of concern. Importantly, it also led to important changes in the behavior of the secondary 
powers in Latin America. As described below, these behaviors mesh with Walt’s description of 
balancing behavior: “If states are in fact choosing to coordinate action, augment their power, and 
take on new commitments with others, because they are worried about the unipole’s dominant 
position and/or are alarmed by the actions it is undertaking, it is appropriate to regard such 
behavior as a form of balancing.”48 
Proponents of the soft-balancing concept have focused on two explanations for limited 
balancing against the United States before 2003. First, they emphasize the geographical isolation 
of the United States from secondary powers. This has been understood as a constant, because 
more geographically proximate states in Latin America and the Caribbean have been deemed too 
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minor to display important balancing behaviors or were subjected to a U.S sphere of influence, 
empire, or hierarchy.49 Taking Latin American responses more seriously allows for an 
examination of the effects of varying distance. Second, the debate around soft balancing has 
focused on a perceived shift in U.S. intentions, with proponents arguing that a primary reason for 
the lack of earlier balancing behavior after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the perception 
that the United States was a restrained hegemon. From at least the 1890s through the early 1930s, 
however, many countries in the Western Hemisphere did not share a belief in the benign 
intentions of the United States.  
The following case, therefore, offers the opportunity for comparison with those that have 
been examined in the literature. It is not intended to “test” soft balancing; the literature does not 
currently offer a fully formed theory of soft balancing from which testable hypotheses could be 
derived. Instead, soft balancing is treated as a concept. Gary Goertz writes, “Developing a 
concept is more than providing a definition; it is deciding what is important about an entity.”50 
As Goertz argues, concepts should be both empirical and theoretical. The application of a 
concept to new empirics allows scholars to ask whether that concept helps illuminate events and 
processes. The case at hand sheds light on which unipolar behaviors may spur soft balancing, the 
motivations and tactics of the balancers, and how the practice of soft balancing need not 
inevitably lead to hard balancing or bring bad outcomes for the United States. 
The Case: Soft Balancing against the United States, 1898-1936 
From the late 1890s to the 1930s, the wealthiest Latin American country, Argentina, soon joined 
by the first revolutionary power of the twentieth century, Mexico, undertook what would become 
a hemispheric effort to constrain the ability of the United States to deploy military force in Latin 
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America. Their distinct geopolitical interests and national diplomatic traditions led them to take 
the lead at critical moments in efforts at soft balancing that coincided or were directly 
coordinated. This was not merely diplomatic friction over transient disputes but represented a 
sustained, systemic balancing effort through coalition building, international law, and 
multinational institutions.   
Latin America in the early twentieth century faced a United States so disproportionately 
powerful that it had been able to absorb half of Mexico’s territory in 1848, replace Spanish 
colonial rule directly in Puerto Rico and indirectly in Cuba in 1898, take control of a wide swath 
of Panama in 1903, then send the Marines to govern directly or rule by proxy in Nicaragua 
(1912-33), Haiti (1915-34), and the Dominican Republic (1916-24). The end of U.S. occupations 
in the circum-Caribbean that followed is typically credited to Franklin Roosevelt’s benevolence 
and the “Good Neighbor policy” he (and his predecessor, Herbert Hoover) determined would be 
more advantageous to the United States by reducing the costs of occupation once compliant 
dictatorships were keeping order on their own. In fact, as explained below, the dictators were not 
always so compliant, and Roosevelt’s decision to commit the United States formally to a policy 
of nonintervention in Latin America was not an act of noblesse oblige but the culmination of 
several decades of diplomatic and legal activism in multinational forums by Latin American 
countries in what appears now to have been a strategy of soft balancing.  
Just as the 2002-03 soft balancing effort by France, Germany and Russia to oppose the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq took place in the United Nations, much of Latin America’s soft balancing 
project unfolded in the context of the emerging inter-American diplomatic system, the recurring 
conferences launched in 1889 as part of the U.S.-sponsored project of Pan-Americanism. David 
Sheinin has described Pan-Americanism as a program to integrate Latin America into a U.S.-led 
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system based on political, commercial, legal, and defense coordination.51 Argentina led the 
opposition to U.S. initiatives in this process, often sponsoring its own counterproposals centered 
on the defense of national sovereignty. That led Nicaraguan nationalist poet Rubén Darío to 
prophesy that “on the balance scales of the American continent, it is the Argentine Republic that 
gives us the counterweight to Yankee power.”52 After the Mexican Revolution of 1910-17, 
Mexico, too, played a leading role in rallying opposition to U.S. intervention in the region. This 
pattern persisted through recurring inter-American conferences—the precursors to the current 
system centered on the Organization of American States—between 1889 and 1936, when the 
United States finally agreed without reservations to Latin American demands to formally 
renounce military intervention in the hemisphere as a tool of statecraft. 
Taken in isolation, each confrontation at each conference, it could be argued, might be 
better understood as falling into the category of the “conventional policy disputes and diplomatic 
bargaining” Brooks and Wohlforth describe. The whole record of decades of maneuvering to get 
the United States ultimately to endorse the principle of nonintervention, however, seems much 
more significant than the sum of its parts. Indeed, it represents a striking case of soft balancing as 
an alternative to bandwagoning for weaker powers. 
The two lesser powers each had its own reasons for challenging U.S. hard power. 
Mexico’s interest in constraining military intervention is self-evident, not only because of the 
traumatic loss of its northern territory in the 1840s, but because of the U.S. shelling and 
occupation for five months of the port of Veracruz (1914) and the yearlong campaign by Gen. 
John Pershing and his army of 10,000 men who repeatedly violated Mexican sovereignty to try 
to stop border incursions by Mexican rebels (1916). Moreover, Mexico’s foreign policy has 
never been confined to the subservient position implied in the famous lament of its last 
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prerevolution autocrat Porfirio Díaz: “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United 
States.” Díaz himself diverged from U.S. policy in Central America, and Mexico carved out 
substantial room for independent stands after the revolution and throughout the Cold War.53  
Argentina, which initiated the balancing project in the early twentieth century, may in our 
time seem an unlikely country to have launched a bid for international leadership, but in those 
days it was widely recognized to be on the ascendant. By 1910 Argentina was the world’s largest 
grain exporter and had the highest per capita level of international trade on Earth. Buenos Aires 
boasted a world-famous opera, a subway, and the second-largest port in the Americas (after New 
York). Europeans favored the expression “as rich as an Argentine.”54 When it began to oppose 
the United States in international forums, Argentina drew the ire of U.S. officials.55 Argentina 
was in a position to anchor a soft-balancing coalition in part because of geographical factors: not 
only was Argentina remote from the United States, but the Pampas region produced similar 
agricultural goods to the U.S. heartland, making them commercial competitors and directing 
Argentine exporters’ gaze toward the industrial powers of Europe. That made Argentina less 
dependent on the United States than the Central American and Caribbean countries were. For 
Argentine elites, the economic success of their country, the European origin of most of its 
population, and its important role in transatlantic trade justified the assertion of a leadership role 
in the Americas.56  
The Pan-American project arose in a context of competition among empires. While 
Europeans fought over the resources and markets of the developing world through intervention 
in Africa and Asia, the United States entered the fray in the War of 1898 and with expansive 
versions of the Monroe Doctrine in the Olney (1895) and Roosevelt (1904) corollaries that 
asserted a U.S. right to intervene at will throughout Latin America. As the United States 
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increased its investments in South America , Argentine leaders, like their counterparts in Brazil 
and Chile, calculated the costs and benefits of aligning with one of the great powers. Brazil’s 
practice of bandwagoning with the United States rather than seeking to balance it dated from the 
era the Baron of Rio Branco (José Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr.), who spent a decade (1902-1912) 
as Brazil’s foreign minister. He sought to boost his country’s quest for regional leadership and 
balance Argentina’s growing strength by aligning Brazil’s foreign policy with that of its biggest 
coffee customer, the United States, receiving as a reward the first U.S. ambassador accredited to 
South America. In Pan-American conferences, Brazil was generally a reliable partner of the 
United States.57 Chile’s concerns in this era included preventing external interference in its 
territorial disputes with Peru and defending its right to maintain neutrality in the First World 
War. Chile opposed a Brazilian project to get Latin American countries to adopt the Monroe 
Doctrine as a continental declaration, citing U.S. intervention in the Caribbean.58 
 There was more to Argentine policy than rhetorical cover for entering the geopolitical 
bazaar or the fleeting pleasure of grandiloquent, self-inflicted wounds. Soft balancing was a 
more substantial and effective program than has been acknowledged, and one that replaced the 
leverage available to lesser powers from latching onto the force of a great power with the 
leverage available from appropriating the legitimacy increasingly tied in the twentieth century to 
international norms and multilateral institutions. This strategy was not designed at a single 
moment or even recognized by its authors as such; as Michael Fortmann, T.V. Paul, and James 
Wirtz have observed, “soft balancing strategies are ad hoc.”59 Instead, it developed in stages with 
multiple lines of origin involving cooperation among a shifting constellation of foreign partners, 
including many other Latin American players. Nonetheless, in the initial effort to counterbalance 
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the growing U.S. threat to the autonomy of Latin American and Caribbean states, Argentina led 
the way. 
 The Argentine strategy focused on changing international norms for interstate behavior 
through law, diplomacy, and multinational institutions. Argentina’s most famous international 
jurist-diplomats, Carlos Calvo (1824-1906) and Luis María Drago (1859-1921), promoted formal 
doctrines designed to constrain the great powers from violating the national sovereignty of 
weaker powers by using force to collect debts. Gunboat diplomacy practiced by the great powers 
made the rights of foreign capital an existential question for Latin American debtor nations, 
including Argentina. Argentine thinkers had been wrestling for some time with the need to 
preserve inflows of foreign capital while protecting weaker Latin American states from the 
power of the investors’ home governments when disputes arose. As early as the 1860s, Calvo 
began to campaign for an absolute prohibition on diplomatic or military intervention for debt 
collection. At a time when most European countries and the United States promulgated a 
doctrine of diplomatic protection that held that their nationals were entitled to preferential 
treatment and effective extraterritorial sovereignty, Calvo argued in his Le droit international 
théorique et pratique [Theoretical and Practical International Law] (1868) that parties that 
develop grievances in the course of doing business in a foreign country must seek redress 
through that country’s judicial system rather than turning to their home governments for 
satisfaction.60 When diplomatic or military pressure led to one country’s nationals being 
compensated ahead of other claimants, this violated the principle of pari passu, which holds that 
creditors should be paid equally and without preference. (A century later, pari passu was central 
to the dispute between Argentina and a few hedge fund investors unsatisfied with the debt 
rescheduling negotiated with most of its creditors.)61 
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Although the Calvo Doctrine did not find formal acceptance in international law,62 
Argentine diplomats followed Calvo by continuing to press for the adoption of new norms to 
constrain the great powers—increasingly directed specifically at balancing the United States—in 
international venues.63  Secretary of State James Blaine launched the First Pan-American 
Conference in 1889 to try to create a customs union and system of arbitration in Latin America, 
both under U.S. leadership. The Argentine delegation, led by future president Roque Sáenz Peña, 
was successful in rallying Latin American support to block the U.S. projects, and pressed, over 
U.S. objections, its own resolutions prohibiting territorial conquest and asserting the juridical 
equality of states.64 At the Second Pan-American Conference in 1902-03, Argentina submitted a 
version of the Calvo Doctrine, prohibiting extraterritorial intervention (diplomatic or military) to 
resolve pecuniary disputes and holding that natives and foreigners were equal before the law. By 
articulating a concern widespread in Latin America and persuasively lobbying the other 
delegations, the Argentines succeeded in isolating the United States: every delegation present 
signed the resolution except the United States and Haiti.65  
 The confrontation between Argentina and the United States came into sharp relief in the 
same period over the Venezuela crisis. In 1902-03, a joint naval force sponsored by Germany, 
Great Britain, and Italy shelled and occupied Venezuelan ports after the Venezuelan government 
fell behind on loan payments during its civil war. The events provoked outrage in Argentina; as 
its leading daily La Nación editorialized, the attack was “a latent aggression against any of the 
nations that have grown from the same cradle. Today you, tomorrow me.”66 While belatedly 
objecting to European intervention, President Theodore Roosevelt articulated a special U.S. right 
to intervene, to exercise “international police power” in the hemisphere, in what came to be 
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt’s motto “speak softly but 
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carry a big stick” acquired new resonance for Latin Americans, who thought the big stick was 
aimed at them. Their fears seemed realized when Roosevelt, dissatisfied with Colombian 
demands in negotiating rights to an isthmian canal, helped revolutionaries break Panama away 
from Colombia in 1903. The Roosevelt Corollary and the interventions in Panama, Cuba (1906), 
and the Dominican Republic (1905), where the United States set up a customs receivership to 
ensure foreign investors would be first in line for any government revenues. As in 2003, the 
combination of U.S. actions and explicit doctrine spurred soft balancing by secondary powers. 
Marshaling Latin American opposition, Foreign Minister Drago, wrote a message to the 
Roosevelt administration calling for an absolute prohibition on military intervention in “the 
territory of American nations.”67 The Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa proclaimed that 
Argentina was fulfilling its “great mission” by “defending the principle of sovereignty for all 
Latin America in the face of the Big Stick.”68 
 Drago’s message to Roosevelt might have been forgotten had it not been for Calvo’s 
seizing the moment to campaign for its acceptance in international law. Drago asked him to give 
the doctrine the widest possible circulation.69 Calvo was exhilarated: “For more than forty years I 
have been fighting the practice of armed interventions, whatever the cause that motivates them, 
and I am prepared to decidedly support the principles so accurately articulated by your 
excellency and that have my enthusiastic support.”70 As Argentine minister to France and a 
member of both the Institut de France and the Institut de Droit International in Paris, Calvo 
appealed to his network of fellow jurists throughout Western Europe to formally state their 
support for the Drago Doctrine.71 Leading international law experts who signed on included 
Frédéric Passy, president of the French Society for International Arbitration and joint winner of 
the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901; Gustave Moynier, president of the International Committee 
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of the Red Cross; André Weiss, author of Manuel de droit international privé [Manual of Private 
International Law]; and Thomas Erskine Holland of Oxford University and author of Studies in 
International Law.72 That enabled Argentina to draw upon the soft resources of legitimacy 
represented by the world’s preeminent authorities on international law when making claims 
within the international system. 
 The contrasting visions of appropriate behavior of states clashed visibly in international 
forums. At the Third Pan-American Conference in 1906, Argentina sought the adoption of the 
Drago Doctrine forbidding military intervention, but the United States managed to thwart the 
resolution. At the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, the Argentine delegation and 
some of the supporters Calvo had mobilized in Europe were determined to see the Drago 
Doctrine enshrined into international law. The delegates of the great powers, especially Great 
Britain and the United States, were determined to vitiate it. The initial British position was 
essentially that Britannia waived the rules. The British delegation’s instructions were “to reserve 
the right of the Governments of the injured individuals to decide for themselves in each case 
whether a resort to armed interference would be justified.” But faced with pressure from a score 
of countries to support the Argentine position, British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey then 
consented to align his government with the U.S. proposal that placed international arbitration as 
an intermediate step between complaint and armed intervention.73 As an alternative to war to 
settle disputes, arbitration was widely accepted in Latin America, including in Argentina, which 
both practiced and preached its virtues, agreeing to arbitration in boundary disputes with Chile 
and Brazil.74 
 The U.S. position was not to reject the Drago Doctrine outright, but to embrace it with 
fingers crossed. Although personally impressed by Drago’s erudition and diplomatic skills,75 the 
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U.S. and U.K. delegations joined forces to amend his doctrine with a loophole big enough to sail 
a gunboat through. Where Drago had spoken of public debt and an absolute prohibition on 
military force, the amended version pushed through by U.S. delegate Col. Horace Porter referred 
only to “contractual debts” and called for compulsory arbitration—after which noncompliance 
by the debtor nation could be punished by military action. Latin Americans present understood 
that this hardly barred gunboat diplomacy; as Argentina’s delegate Roque Sáenz Peña put it, the 
arrangement “envisaged international Judges as the adversaries of sovereignty, and as the 
enemies of national honor.”76 Argentina registered two formal reservations, calling for disputes 
over contractual debts not to be submitted to international arbitration but to go before national 
courts, and stating that public loans “cannot in any circumstances give rise to military 
aggression.”77 The “Porter Doctrine” that supplanted Drago at The Hague immediately sparked a 
clash with Latin American countries over representation at the International Court of Justice, 
which the United States and Great Britain sought to dominate, and where Argentina, Brazil, and 
other Latin American states demanded equal representation—not only on the principle of the 
juridical equality of states, but to ward off the possibility that the international body would 
become merely one more instrument for future intervention.  
 Were the story to end there, with defeat snatched from the jaws of victory at The Hague, 
the Argentine exercise in soft balancing would have been insignificant, an ignominious failure. 
But by taking= a longer view, one can see the seeds planted by Calvo and Drago, and the 
consistent tradition in Argentine foreign policy of pushing back against U.S. projects of 
hemispheric integration under its leadership, growing and bearing fruit. The Latin American 
countries that joined Argentina in expressing reservations along similar lines at The Hague 
included Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
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Peru, and Uruguay.78 Having failed to persuade the entire conference to go along, Latin 
American governments began taking matters into their own hands, changing by national law the 
international norms on intervention within the Americas. They incorporated Calvo’s principles 
into the language of contracts with foreign corporations, legal statutes, or even their constitutions 
in the form of the so-called Calvo Clause, requiring parties doing business under those laws or 
contracts to agree to be bound by the host country’s judicial system. (Among the countries that at 
one point included a version of the Calvo Doctrine in their constitutions are Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.) Foreigners who wanted to do business in 
those countries had to agree to the new terms restoring national sovereignty over international 
capital or look elsewhere for investment opportunities.79 Argentina, along with numerous Latin 
American supporters, advanced international norms with far-reaching effects beyond what could 
be traced in the letter of international law. As renowned newspaper editor William Stead put it in 
1908, Drago was “the one man” who had “permanently changed” international relations through 
international law, making his name “deservedly famous around the world.”80 At this early date, 
the Argentine strategy of rallying multinational opposition to unilateral intervention through 
international organizations had borne fruit. The key role played by particular individuals further 
demonstrates the theoretical value of linking soft balancing with constructivist insights. 
Enter Mexico 
If Argentina’s faded grandeur is largely forgotten by today’s international relations community, 
so is Mexico’s outsized impact on international relations in the inter-American system—as is the 
importance of their synchronized opposition to U.S. military intervention. During the long 
Porfirio Díaz regime (1877-1911), U.S. officials generally considered Mexico a compliant ally, 
welcoming of U.S. investments and unlikely to lead opposition to U.S. foreign policy. Theodore 
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Roosevelt went so far as to propose that reliable Mexico should annex Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic and also “run” Central America.81 Nonetheless, prerevolutionary Mexico was not a 
vassal state, and Mexican officials objected to U.S. interventions, including in Nicaragua in 
1909, when Mexican Ambassador Enrique Creel devoted his Christmas holiday to trying to 
persuade President William Howard Taft not to land troops. Creel saw it as his objective to 
“defend principles of international law that are of interest to the good harmony of a whole 
continent,” and reported sympathy from nearly every Latin American envoy in Washington.82 
Argentina’s envoy in Mexico City, Juan Agustín García, saw a “new round of imperialist policy 
in Washington.” Cooperation between the two countries provided an opportunity. “We should 
seek the closest relations possible with Mexico,” he wrote to his ministry, “in order to establish a 
balance in the Americas.” Their goal should be “counteracting the influence and dominating 
tendencies of the Colossus of the North.”83  
 Argentina won some goodwill with Mexico during the revolution, when President 
Woodrow Wilson ordered the occupation of Veracruz, and Argentina stepped in with an offer to 
mediate, along with Brazil and Chile. The ABC countries’ mediation, which fundamentally 
assumed that the occupation was illegitimate, helped bring the crisis to a peaceful end with U.S. 
withdrawal and “nullified the aims of the United States’ armed intervention,” as the Argentine 
foreign minister put it.84 The three countries reached out again during Pershing’s punitive 
expedition in Mexico in 1916, again winning Mexican gratitude. Mexico’s foreign minister later 
praised the South American diplomacy for helping to prevent a war with the United States “that 
would have been fatal to us.”85  
 After the revolution, Mexico would present the most thoroughgoing challenge to foreign 
investment and U.S. interests by asserting, in stages, control over its own mineral resources in 
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Article 27 of the new constitution; incorporating the Calvo Clause stricture that financial 
disputes with foreigners must go before Mexican courts in Article 103; and then nationalizing 
foreign petroleum enterprises outright in 1938. That challenge is well known. Less remembered 
in U.S. policymaking circles is that it was coupled with an ambitious foreign policy agenda 
aimed at spreading the revolution’s conceptions of international behavior to other states in the 
Americas. President Venustiano Carranza (1917-20) issued what came to be known as the 
Carranza Doctrine in 1918, embodying Mexico’s vision of how international affairs should be 
conducted: all nations are equal under the law, which meant that there could be no legitimate 
intervention with no exceptions. Nationals and foreigners are also equal under the law and 
subject to the sovereignty of the state where they reside, meaning there could be no 
extraterritoriality or special protections for foreign investors.86 This point illustrates a problem 
with Brooks and Wohlforth’s presentation of economic motives as an alternative explanation; in 
this instance, Mexican economic policy was closely intertwined with the country’s attempts to 
curtail the United States’ arbitrary use of unilateral power.  
Mexico’s commitment to the principles of nonintervention and the juridical equality of 
states could be expected of a country that had lost half its territory its powerful northern 
neighbor. Obsessed with interventions because it has been the object of the obsessive attentions 
of intervening powers, Mexico later codified this doctrine as the official foreign policy of the 
state in Article 89, Section 10 of the Constitution: “The Executive Power will observe the 
following ruling principles: self-determination of peoples, nonintervention, peaceful resolution 
of disputes, the proscription of the threat or the use of force in international relations; juridical 
equality of states, international cooperation for development, and the struggle for international 
peace and security.”87 
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 Mexico, a relatively weak state next to a very strong one that had routinely intervened in 
its affairs, hoped that a system of international law based on the principles of nonintervention 
and juridical equality could become a way for weak states to defend their interests, and thereby 
to balance the overwhelming power of the United States. Mexican Foreign Secretary Genaro 
Estrada in 1930 extended the goal from nonintervention to noninterference by declaring that 
Mexico would no longer recognize or make judgments about the nature of foreign governments, 
whether they come to power legally or extralegally.88 The “Estrada Doctrine” or “Mexico 
Doctrine” was invoked by other countries following the model, which acknowledged that 
diplomatic representatives are accredited to the state and not to the government.  
 Working cooperatively, Argentina and Mexico managed by the 1930s to realize one of 
soft balancing’s most significant diplomatic achievements: persuading the United States to 
formally abjure intervention. At a 1928 inter-American conference held in Havana, the Argentine 
delegation led broad Latin American demands for a general agreement against intervention in 
light of three decades of U.S. Marine landings in Central America and the Caribbean. The head 
of the Argentine delegation, Honorio Pueyrredón, strongly denounced U.S. intervention in 
Nicaragua, reaffirmed Argentina’s “unbreakable conviction” on nonintervention, then stalked out 
of the conference when U.S. delegate Charles Evans Hughes refused to discuss the issue. Mexico 
seconded the Argentines, and El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Guatemala, 
and Colombia followed.89 Even “puppet” dictators in several of those countries turned out to 
have a degree of autonomy in foreign policy, and many used it to seek to delegitimize U.S. 
military intervention in the region. 
 The about-face that became the heart of Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy 
began under Roosevelt’s predecessor, Herbert Hoover. As president-elect in late 1928, Hoover 
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went on a ten-week tour of Latin America, where he was startled at the level of criticism he 
encountered, from demonstrations to challenges from government officials. President Hipólito 
Yrigoyen of Argentina was most direct. At a banquet for Hoover, Yrigoyen called for the 
American states to become “entities reigned by ethical norms so lofty that their power cannot be 
a danger to justice, nor a shadow projected upon the sovereignty of the other states.” In a private 
meeting, the Argentine president startled Hoover into a brief silence by stating that U.S. 
intervention on behalf of its citizens’ claims had rendered U.S. investment hazardous to national 
sovereignty.90 During this trip Hoover impressed Latin American officials by showing, as an 
Argentine diplomat put it, “a lively interest in learning the reasons for this antipathy toward the 
United States—an interest based in the desire to remove the causes that motivate it.”91 A few 
weeks after taking office, Hoover gave an address stating that “it never has been and ought not to 
be the policy of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts between 
our citizens and foreign States or their citizens.”92 This announcement made Hoover the first 
U.S. president to accept the Argentine doctrines of Calvo and Drago. He then withdrew the 
Marines from occupation duty in Nicaragua, where their war against rebels led by Augusto 
Sandino had long hurt the U.S. image throughout the region.  
 Hoover’s receptiveness to Latin American views was an essential element in the change 
to U.S. policy. A different president might not have been as responsive to pressure from Latin 
America. That pressure was another decisive element, however.93 Hoover’s secretary of state, 
Henry Stimson, observed in a 1931 radio broadcast that “sore spots” in U.S.-Latin American 
relations “have damaged our good name, our credit, and our trade far beyond the apprehension of 
our own people,” and claimed progress in the U.S. effort “to eradicate the sore spots of Latin-
American diplomacy.”94 Mexican diplomats similarly believed that Latin American public 
32 
 
opinion and “declarations of an official character, such as those produced in Mexico recently” 
had caused these changes in “the conduct of the international policy of the United States.”95  
 Franklin Roosevelt went further than his predecessor in ending the long tradition of 
unbridled intervention. He withdrew the Marines from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He 
terminated the Platt amendment, forced upon Cuba in 1901 to codify a U.S. right to unilateral 
intervention at will in that country. Roosevelt even ordered his diplomats in Latin America to 
follow the principle of the Mexican Estrada Doctrine: the State Department relinquished the use 
of nonrecognition to sanction regimes that came to power through force, and its officers declined 
even to offer comment or advice on domestic questions in Latin American countries. U.S. policy 
had gone in a few short decades from defending military intervention to abjuring not only 
intervention but interference in the internal affairs of Latin American states.  
 The context of the global Depression meant that the direct costs of stationing military 
forces abroad loomed large, and the political costs at home and internationally seemed to 
outweigh the benefits. Armed insurgencies in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua also 
inflicted pain that contributed importantly to the U.S. withdrawal.96 So did anti-imperialist and 
nongovernmental peace organizations in the United States and Latin America. The extent of 
international popular pressure was reflected, for example, in the million signatures from citizens 
of the Americas collected by a transnational feminist peace group to deliver to the delegates at 
the 1936 conference in Buenos Aires.97 A transformation as significant as the U.S. shift from 
frequent intervention to nonintervention in Latin America was thus necessarily the product of 
multicausality. Beyond changes in the personnel of U.S. administrations, a departure from the 
tradition of interventionism was made possible in part because of the extent to which much of 
Latin America was ruled by men generally willing to go along with the strategic goals and 
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fundamental demands of the United States. Most countries in Central America and the Caribbean 
were by Franklin Roosevelt’s time firmly in the hands of a collection of dictators whose rigorous 
suppression of popular movements and abstention from forms of economic nationalism that 
might threaten U.S. investments seemed to make U.S. troops superfluous. The dictators were 
capable of exercising autonomy within the framework of U.S. predominance, and caudillos 
(strongmen) such as Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Anastasio Somoza of 
Nicaragua did not cooperate with every request from the State Department. Support for 
dictatorship and military rule made it easier, however, for the United States to behave in a more 
“neighborly” fashion while still achieving its principal goals. 
 Too little attention has been given to yet another factor: the decades of steady pressure 
from Latin American countries, led by Argentina and joined by Mexico, to adopt new norms of 
international behavior.98 This often took place within the mechanism of the Pan-American 
conferences organized every few years at the ministerial level, initially at U.S. request. The inter-
American system is a good example both of Paul’s recent observation that soft balancing often 
includes “collaboration in regional or international institutions,” and Josef Joffe’s remark 
apropos of disputes of the 1990s that “Great powers loathe international institutions they cannot 
dominate; lesser nations like them the way the Lilliputians liked their ropes on Gulliver.”99  
 The United States’ ambivalence toward the Pan-American system it had created after its 
domination had weakened  prefigured twenty-first-century U.S. impatience with the United 
Nations it helped create after it could no longer dominate that institution. And just as the French, 
German, and Russian opposition to the George W. Bush administration at the United Nations 
focused not on forestalling any aggressive moves aimed at their own territory but at the planned 
invasion of Iraq, the Argentine and Mexican opposition to U.S. intervention in Central America 
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and the Caribbean was not strictly a defensive response to a threat to their own territory but 
represented a broader and more long-range desire to reduce the potential for future U.S. military 
interventions in the entire region. As Pape put it, “Concerns over indirect threats are likely to be 
greater in unipolar systems than in other balance of power systems. … Hence, other states may 
have reason to oppose military action by a unipolar leader, even if it has no intention of harming 
them directly.”100 Paul argues that soft balancing tends to occur when the unipole’s “power 
position and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious challenge to 
the sovereignty of second-tier powers” and “the dominant state cannot easily retaliate either 
because the balancing efforts of others are not overt or because they do not directly challenge its 
power position with military means.”101 Although Mexico was still smarting from the injuries to 
its sovereignty, these conditions fit Latin American diplomatic history in this period.  
 In the lead-up to the 1933 conference at Montevideo, Mexican expectations were initially 
low. The prospect of an accord on nonintervention seemed unlikely, according to career diplomat 
Fernando González Roa, because “the United States cannot get anything from us nor can we get 
anything from them.”102 But Argentina pressed forward, and Mexico decided to try to coordinate 
a joint offensive. Mexico’s foreign secretary, J.M. Puig Casauranc, wrote to his Argentine 
counterpart Carlos Saavedra Lamas, that together they could achieve at Montevideo what had 
long been on their respective agendas. “My ambition is that in Montevideo we completely 
destroy the thesis of Colonel Porter,” Puig wrote, “and bring to discussion at the VII Conference, 
in all of its pristine purity, the Drago Doctrine. If we achieve the acceptance of this Doctrine and 
its juridical translation into a Pan-American convention, the threat that has always hovered over 
almost all of the countries of Latin America will disappear.”103 Saavedra Lamas replied that he 
welcomed the Mexican leadership role in pursuing “the common ideals that for long years have 
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inspired our country and the noble Mexican Republic.”104 Mexican members of the program 
committee got the intervention issue put back on the agenda, and thwarted a proposal emerging 
from the American Institute of International Law that would have included an exception 
permitting intervention in necessary cases.105 Puig’s diplomats fanned out across the region, 
obtaining supportive responses to his proposal to replace the Monroe Doctrine with a continent-
wide assertion of the principle of nonintervention along the lines of the original Drago Doctrine. 
“¡Magnífico! ¡Maravilloso!” cried the Colombian foreign minister, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, 
upon hearing the proposal.106 To manage the unpredictable Foreign Minister Juan Guzmán 
Cruchaga of Chile and the often prickly and proud Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas of 
Argentina, Puig turned to Mexican essayist and diplomat Alfonso Reyes—whom Jorge Luís 
Borges called the greatest prose stylist in the Spanish language—to take on a special mission to 
discreetly win their approval.107 After getting both on board, Puig then let other chancelleries 
know of Argentine and Chilean backing, which led to unanimous support for a nonintervention 
resolution even before the meeting began.108 In the end, the resolution put forward at Montevideo 
brought together the Drago Doctrine and the Carranza Doctrine, since Carranza in 1918 had 
asserted that “no country should intervene in any form or for any reason in the internal affairs of 
another.”109 At Montevideo, conferees resolved that “no state has the right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of another.” Importantly, Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed the 
resolution but presented reservations, arguing that intervention was not defined, so the United 
States would continue to pursue its own policy.  
 Hull’s reservations led Mexico and Argentina to renew their efforts to get an unqualified 
resolution passed at the next inter-American meeting, held in Buenos Aires in 1936. There was 
no need, wrote Carranza’s former foreign secretary Isidro Fabela, now an adviser to the ministry, 
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to “turn Mexico into a Quijote country that seizes any opportunity to challenge the political 
wrongs committed by North America against our Republics of the South,” especially since 
Mexico lacked the power on its own to become the protector of the oppressed. Mexico, however, 
did have “a noble and transcendent mission” to continue an independent foreign policy and to 
express its ideas freely.110 By now, the rise of the fascist powers in Europe and a German trade 
offensive in Latin America motivated the United States to improve cooperation with Latin 
American countries. This time, with President Roosevelt himself in attendance, the Latin 
American diplomats were successful, gaining unanimous agreement to an unqualified resolution 
prohibiting intervention “directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or 
external affairs of the parties.”111 In what came to be called the Good Neighbor policy, the 
United States was endorsing what the Argentines and then the Mexicans had pushed for decades.  
Conclusion 
Was a diplomatic resolution—a scrap of paper—an achievement of soft balancing? Taking into 
account the various structural, economic, and political factors that went into the Roosevelt 
administration’s commitment to the Good Neighbor policy, the long campaign to get 
nonintervention adopted as a norm in the inter-American system—to balance U.S. hard power 
with the softer tools of diplomacy and international law through cooperation in multinational 
institutions—must be seen as a part of that achievement. It is a good example of Robert Art’s 
distinction between policy bargaining, “the attempt to produce favorable outcomes with current 
assets,” versus balancing behavior, “the attempt to augment assets so as to produce better 
outcomes the next time…[B]alancing is as much about preserving a state’s autonomy, 
independence, and ability to influence international outcomes vis-à-vis a powerful state or group 
of states as it is about dealing with threats of direct attack from them.” Latin American states had 
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achieved these improvements using what Art calls “soft assets”—informal alignments and 
international organizations.112 And they had done so “by assembling countervailing coalitions 
designed to thwart or impede specific policies,” in a process that “accepts the current balance of 
power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it,” in Walt’s definition of soft balancing.113 
 The erosion of the Good Neighbor policy began during World War II, with deep 
interference in the internal affairs of many countries by U.S. pressure for them to deport their 
German and Japanese residents, continued with nonrecognition of governments that came to 
power in Argentina and Bolivia, and culminated in Assistant Secretary for Latin American 
Affairs Spruille Braden’s highly publicized crusade to bring down the government of Argentina 
(whose principal effect was to rally Argentines behind Juan Domingo Perón).114 In the 1950s, the 
United States shifted from an earlier tradition of direct military intervention to covert and proxy 
interventions in the cases of Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Guyana (1961-64), Chile (1970-
73), and Nicaragua (1981-90), as well as outright military invasions of the Dominican Republic 
(1965), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989).  
 To see those forms of intervention as the absence of soft balancing would be to argue that 
strategy does not exist unless it is consistently and permanently effective. Moreover, each of 
those Cold War-era interventions produced widespread opposition that reminded U.S. 
policymakers that military action in Latin America brought costs to prestige, which may have 
helped ensure that even the direct military invasions were not followed by the kind of lengthy 
occupations common in the pre-1936 era. The shift from overt to covert intervention was itself a 
reflection of the diminished international tolerance, especially in Latin America, for military 
invasions and extended occupations. Robert Pape used the term “soft balancing” to describe a 
loose international coalition of states that sought to dissuade the United States from invading Iraq 
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in 2003.115 That the United States went ahead with its invasion does not mean that the balancing 
effort did not occur, nor does it mean we should ignore the constraints that became evident in the 
diminished appetite for U.S. military action on a similar scale thereafter. The United States has 
not intervened in the twenty-first century to cause regime change in Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, or Venezuela,116 despite the advent of leftist governments in those 
countries, which does suggest that changed international norms are contributing to constraints on 
what was once an American prerogative. The Barack Obama administration’s late 2014 decision 
to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba and weaken the half-century-old embargo against that 
country was in part a recognition that continuing U.S. infringement of Cuban sovereignty had 
become a major obstacle to improved relations with the region. It also appeared to be a response 
to the soft balancing engaged in by Latin American states, especially South American middle 
powers, which had created multinational institutions excluding the United States such as the 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States, and had strongly criticized the continuing U.S. embargo of Cuba at the Summit 
of the Americas in Cartagena in 2012 and threatened to do so at the 2015 Summit in Panama. In 
a departure from its traditionally cooperative role, Brazil, now with the world’s seventh-largest 
economy, has become one of the leaders of twenty-first-century soft balancing, anchoring 
UNASUR and promoting nonviolent settlements of U.S. confrontations not only with Latin 
American states such as Cuba and Venezuela but in the U.S.-Iranian nuclear dispute.117 The rise 
of numerous leftist governments of various stripes whose survival would have been improbable 
in another era may well owe something to the long-term change in international norms Latin 
American soft balancing helped to achieve—even as the violent aftermath of proxy interventions 
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and counterinsurgency manifests itself in drug wars and unprecedented levels of urban crime in 
many countries in the region. 
Scholarly arguments over soft balancing have focused largely on whether it is happening, 
and if so, whether it might lead to an erosion of U.S. power or even presages the formation of 
dangerous hard balancing against the United States in the future. Stephen Brooks and William 
Wohlforth find “no evidence to support the expectation that the coordinated actions of other 
major powers will compel the United States to be restrained. Instead, the case for restraint will 
hinge on convincing U.S. foreign policy makers that it serves the United States’ long-term 
interest.”118 Of course, one of the ways U.S. policy makers have been moved toward restraint in 
the past is when they recognize that the costs of military intervention are rising. Whether we are 
discussing Marine occupations in the Caribbean or military interventions in Vietnam or Iraq, this 
calculation includes reputational costs driven home by sustained opposition abroad. As Secretary 
of State Stimson noted, the United States had indeed paid a price for its actions in Latin America, 
and reaped rewards from changing course. According to T.V. Paul, if “the hegemonic power in 
response to soft balancing efforts tempers its aggressive behavior, then one can deduce that the 
efforts by second-tier major power states partially succeeded.”119 It may be too soon to know 
whether the Obama administration’s tempering of the U.S. role in the Middle East is such a case. 
The experience of Latin America’s relatively successful soft-balancing effort—followed by the 
immediate benefits to the United States of the Good Neighbor policy in the form of widespread 
solidarity during World War II, and the evolution of a hemisphere in which U.S. interests are 
largely secure—suggests that the emergence of constraints on the use of U.S. military power 
through the development of international law and the strengthening of international institutions 
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need not threaten the United States, even when those changes are initiated by other states seeking 
to balance U.S. predominance.  
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TIMELINE 
1868 Calvo Doctrine (Argentina) proposes end to extraterritorial rights for investors 
1889 First Pan-American Conference: U.S. proposes customs union, thwarted by Argentina 
1895 U.S. asserts its “fiat is law” in Latin America under Olney Doctrine 
1898 U.S. defeats Spain in war, takes control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines  
1901 U.S. imposes interventionist Platt Amendment on Cuba 
1902-3 Second Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes Calvo Doctrine 
1902-3 Germany, Great Britain, Italy send gunboats to Venezuela to collect debt 
1903 Drago Doctrine (Argentina) calls for prohibition on force to collect debts 
1903 U.S. aids Panamanian revolutionaries, acquires Canal Zone 
1904 Roosevelt Corollary (U.S.) asserts unilateral interventionist right  
1905 U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic 
1906 U.S. intervention in Cuba 
1906 Third Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes Drago Doctrine, thwarted by U.S. 
1907 Second Hague Peace Conference: Argentina proposes Drago Doctrine, U.S. amends into 
weaker Porter Doctrine 
1909 U.S. intervention in Nicaragua 
1910-17 Mexican Revolution 
1912 U.S. occupies Nicaragua 
1914 U.S. occupies Veracruz, Argentina, Brazil, Chile mediate withdrawal 
1915 U.S. occupies Haiti 
1916 U.S. occupies Dominican Republic 
1916 U.S. troops pursue Pancho Villa in northern Mexico 
1918 Carranza Doctrine (Mexico) calls for non-intervention in any circumstance 
1928 Sixth Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes non-intervention pact, seconded by 
Mexico; U.S. rejects 
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1928 Herbert Hoover elected, listening tour of South America 
1930 Estrada Doctrine (Mexico) calls for recognition of de facto governments 
1933 Franklin Roosevelt announces Good Neighbor Policy 
1933 Mexico and Argentina push non-intervention on inter-American agenda, combining Drago 
and Carranza Doctrines 
1933 Seventh Pan-American Conference: U.S. signs non-intervention pact with reservations 
1936 U.S. State Department orders policy comparable to Estrada Doctrine 
1936 Mexico and Argentina push unqualified non-intervention resolution on inter-American 
agenda 
1936 Eighth Pan-American Conference: U.S. signs non-intervention pact without reservations 
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